High-stakes admission exams to selective schools create incentives for more intensive study effort possibly increasing study achievements of students. Exploiting the exogenous change of a schooling system and using two waves of TIMSS survey data we find that high-stakes exams increase math test scores of ten-year-old students by 0.2 standard deviations. This effect additionally accrues by around 0.05 standard deviations for students in the top decile, i.e. students who apply for selective schools with the highest probability. Although the effects are similar for both genders, there are indications that girls exert higher study efforts than boys in a more competitive environment. The most perceptive to incentives are test items referring to the cognitive domain of reasoning requiring a deeper understanding of math problems.
Introduction
Literature in psychology, pedagogy, and sociology provides rich evidence that students' motivations to learn are important co-determinants of educational outcomes (Vansteenkiste, Simons, Lens, Sheldon and Deci, 2004; Elliot, McGregor and Gable, 1999) . The typical incentivising external factors that could motivate students to learn and improve their achievements are based on grading and evaluation schemes. Their impact on achievements depends on whether students perceive these factors as relevant for their future outcomes or as a mere task to be fulfilled (Ryan and Deci, 2000) . An example of such external factors is high-stakes testing considered as an important instrument for enhancing students' motivations and educational accountability (Jacob, 2005) . Most empirical studies have focused on exit exams at the end of key schooling stages-as one type of high-stakes testing-and most of them show an increase in study efforts and academic achievements 3 .
However, empirical evidence on the effect of exit exams combines students' motivation to learn with the incentives of teachers and school administrators (Jürges, Schneider and Büchel, 2005) 4 . Results from exit exams at school levels are often publicly known, closely watched, and create strong incentives on the side of teachers and principals. There is abundant evidence that teachers tend to focus on teaching skills being tested at the expense of cultivating more complex skills, which are not tested or cannot be tested easily 5 . Moreover, while exit exams usually test students at the end of the lower and upper secondary stages of education, i.e. at the ages of 15 and 18, relatively little is known about the formation of motivation to learn at the age of 10, i.e.
at the time when pupils transfer from primary to lower secondary education. This age is characterised with high developmental changes and culminating gender differences in brain development (Lenroot et al., 2007) .
In this study, we enrich the existing literature by separating the impact of teachers' incentives from students' motivations to learn. In particular, we explore
whether and to what extent high-stakes admission exams to selective schools affect students' study efforts and consequently their achievements. Our identification strategy exploits the quasi-experimental design of the 2009 school reform in Slovakia that postponed the transition to selective schools by one year, from the end of the 4 th to the end of the 5 th grade. To identify the effect of high-stakes admission exams, we use students' achievements in the 4 th grade from the international survey TIMSS before and after the Slovak reform. In 2007, i.e. before the Slovak reform, the 4 th graders were tested by TIMSS during May and at the beginning of June the same students had to pass the admission exams to selective schools. In 2011, i.e. after the Slovak reform, TIMSS again examined the 4 th graders during May, but these were expected to pass admission exams one year later. Our hypothesis is that this forward shift of a competitive school selection lowered the study incentives of 4 th graders leading to lower study achievements in TIMSS 2011. Since between 2007-2011, the test scores could have followed some longer-term trend for reasons unrelated to the reform, we include to our study the data for students in the Czech Republic. Czechs were also tested by TIMSS 2007 and 2011; however, in both years they passed admission exams to selective schools at the end of the 5 th grade, i.e. such as it happened to be in Slovakia after the 4 reform. We employ the difference-in-differences methodology to identify the causal effect of admission exams and achievements.
Contrary to school exit exams, the results from high-stakes admission exams to selective schools are not publicly released, are not perceived as an indicator of school quality, and hence, do not create motivations on the side of teachers. Moreover, in our empirical case, there is anecdotal evidence that primary schools consider this early transition to selective schools as a threat to losing their best students. 6 For these reasons, teachers and schools usually do not provide additional tutoring and do not teach to these admission exams (Straková and Greger, 2013; Federičová and Münich, 2014) . The effect of high-stakes admission exams we study can be thus attributed only to incentives of students and their parents.
High-stakes admission exams at early ages are a part of the admission process in the so-called Academic Schools that occur in most central European countries such as Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary. This selection takes place at the end of primary education. There is anecdotal evidence that some parents and students take these exams very seriously. Using data from a unique longitudinal study 7 in the Czech Republic, Federičová and Münich (2014) examine the scale and scope of the exam preparation. They document that among 20% of those who apply, nearly 85% devote some time to their preparation every week during the last semester before the admission exam, and among those, even more than half of them prepare for admissions almost every day. At the same time, only a small group of students (15%) 6 Currently, schooling ministries in both countries consider the reduction of enrolment in Academic Schools, since the driving reason is perceived as an adverse impact of brain-drain on mainstream schools. 7 The Czech Longitudinal Study in Education (CLoSE) follows the cohort of students in the Czech Republic that were tested in the 4 th grade by TIMSS and PIRLS 2011. Data include detailed questions about the intention to apply for Academic School, the preparation for admission exams and their results in 2012. For a further description of CLoSE survey see Straková and Greger (2013) .
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has an opportunity to attend a preparatory course at their school. This again confirms the low interest of schools in supporting the school transition of their students.
Moreover, Federičová and Münich (2014) also show that the vast majority (90%) apply on the basis of their own and their parents' interests and only half of the teachers agree with their school transition.
Our estimates imply that high-stakes exams increase math test scores of tenyear-old students by 0.2 standard deviations. Using the quantile regression, this effect additionally accrues by 0.05 standard deviations for students in the top decile of the math test score distribution, i.e. students who apply for selective schools with the highest probability. Besides the impact on the overall math score, we also investigate the impact on test scores covering different cognitive domains: knowing, applying, and reasoning. We find that equally to the basic skills-measured by the knowing partstudents also improve their skills in more complex contents measured by the reasoning parts. Furthermore, we find some differences in behaviour between girls and boys.
Although the main effect of admission exams is about the same, girls seem to put higher study efforts into succeeding in the admission exam in districts that have a more intense selection process.
Our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the role of motivations and the existing empirical findings on the effect of high-stakes testing on students' achievements. Section 3 describes the process of academic selection in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Section 4 and 5 discuss the data and the identification strategy. Section 6 presents the results, and Section 7 concludes. 
Literature Review
In the field of educational psychology, motivation plays an important role in exerting efforts, enhancing educational outcomes (Crumpton and Gregory, 2011; Hidi and Harackiewicz, 2000) , and in the long-run, it can also affect labor market outcomes of individuals (Dunifon and Duncan, 1998) . This is reflected in the commonly accepted definition of motivation that defines it as a force that moves one to act (Ryan and Deci, 2000) . Classical motivational theory distinguishes two types of motivation, intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic motivation is linked to individual interests and has a positive impact on students' achievements. Extrinsic motivation accrues from external factors such as rewards, deadlines, competition, or performance evaluations and can foster or undermine the impact of intrinsic motivations (Crumpton and Gregory, 2011) .
Keeping the dichotomy of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in mind, Ryan and Deci (2000) formulated a new self-determination theory (SDT). SDT defines several types of extrinsic motivation differing by the level of self-determination. In other words, the distinguishing feature is the extent one perceives external factors as important for their own sake. Some external factors motivate individuals only to obtain rewards or to avoid punishments. These incentives disappear with the disappearance of the source of motivation and hence do not motivate individuals to acquire new skills or personal goal formation. On the other hand, there are external factors that are personalized and finally identified as individual to that person. Although this extrinsic motivation is not driven by some inherent interest-as it is in the case of intrinsic motivation-it can enhance intrinsic motivation when students perceive the external factors as important for their present or future outcomes.
High-stakes exams, such as those related to school admissions or school grade, represent specific external factors of motivation. Although they are usually not intended to foster motivation per se, they do so because they are widely perceived as prestigious and important for future school outcomes.
8 Therefore, they can facilitate intrinsic motivation, and hence, lead to higher achievements. Several empirical studies found a positive effect of such high-stakes exams. Jacob (2005) This is because schools have no interest in losing their best students.
Intergenerational transmission literature 9 provides evidence that parents play an important role in the interaction among extrinsic motivations. In our case, it is the 8 In particular, more than 90% of students in the CLoSE survey perceive the success in admission to selective schools as a gateway to university education. 9 For the impact of the family background on children academic outcomes, see Cunha and Heckman (2007); Feinstein (2003); and Anger and Heineck (2010) . For the impact of parents attitudes on the development of children´s attitudes and on the creation of their goals and motives, see Grolnick and Ryan (1989); Friedel, Cortina, Turner and Midgley (2007) .
8 parental push to apply for selective schools and to prepare for admissions. Moreover, there are good reasons to expect a different impact on genders. At the time of early school selection-usually at the age of ten or eleven-boys are less mature and are less responsive to parental authority than girls (Wilder and Powell, 1989) . Although the effect of parental background seems to be stronger in the case of boys at this stage, girls are more aware of the importance of these admission exams and put greater efforts in preparation for admissions. Hence, one can expect that the presence of a selection at younger ages is increasing more girls' achievements. However, we do not observe corresponding differences in gender composition in selective schools. This can be explained by the stressful nature of high-stakes exams and a distinct perception of stress by genders. As documented by Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) and Jurajda and Münich (2011) , high-stakes admissions may give rise to psychological stress that probably works against girls´ success in admissions. As a consequence, the greater sense of purpose of girls does not necessarily translate into greater success in admissions.
School Selection in the Czech Republic and Slovakia
Our identification strategy relies on a policy intervention in Slovakia. In addition to Slovak data, we use data from the Czech Republic to control for common trends. Both systems allow for the early tracking of students into selective schools. In particular, at the end of the 5th grade, a small proportion of students have an option to move from so-called Basic School (lasting 8 -9 grades) into the so-called Academic
School. Studies at Academic School last eight years and cover both the lower-and upper-secondary levels. In both countries, school types similar to Academic Schools had tradition before the Second World War but were closed by the communist regime in The teacher-pupil ratio -in primary education 1:17 1:17 1:16 1:14 -in lower secondary education 1:12 1:11 1:12 1:11
Owner structure of primary and lower secondary education -% of students in private schools 0,6% 0,8% 0,6% 0,9% -% of students in church schools 0,6% 0,7% 4,8% 5,1% Although the curriculum taught at Academic Schools does not differ from the curriculum taught in the corresponding grades of mainstream Basic Schools, it is taught there in greater depth and intensity, and higher study requirements are imposed.
Compared to Basic Schools, Academic Schools have been perceived as more prestigious, of better quality, securing better peers, and as a result, they considerably increase students' chances in admission to high quality universities (Dearden, Ferri and Meghir, 2002) . Since the number of slots is kept fixed, Academic Schools have been facing substantial excess demand since their re-establishment in the 1990s. The excess demand generates extrinsic study motivation to pass demanding admission exams.
Since 1989 
Data
TIMSS is an international 10 survey testing 4 th graders in mathematics and science skills in four-year cycles 11 . We employ two successive rounds of TIMSS: the 2007 round, i.e. before the school reform in Slovakia, and the 2011 round, i.e. after the reform. We also use data from the Czech Republic serving us as a control group.
In our investigation, we deal not only with the overall math scores but also with test scores mapping to three cognitive domains (Mullis, Martin and Foy, 2008): knowing, applying, and reasoning. 40% of TIMSS math test items are aimed at the student´s knowledge base (knowing domain), 40% at the ability to apply math knowledge (applying domain), and 20% at deeper understanding of math problems (reasoning domain). Individual math test items were constructed in a way to enable the 10 The TIMSS assessment data are comparable across all participating countries since all students who are in TIMSS are tested by the same set of test items. Moreover, various procedures during the preparation of test items ensure compatibility of the test results across all countries (Mullis, Martin and Foy, 2008) . 11 The assessment data from the first cycle of TIMSS in 1995 were scaled by setting the mean test scores from all participating countries equal to 500 and the standard deviation to 100 (Olson, Martin and Mullis, 2008) . In each successive TIMSS cycle, the assessment data were placed on a scale from the previous cycle to provide accurate measures for trends across all cycles of TIMSS.
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comparison between these cognitive achievement scales (Mullis, Martin and Foy, 2008 To account for possible dependence of the strength of extrinsic motivations on student's demographic and socio-economic family background, we control for individual characteristics. In particular, following common practice, we use the number of books at home as a proxy for socio-economic family background 13 . TIMSS reports the number of books on a discrete scale. The distributions of book possession are 12 TIMSS provide five plausible values that represent student math test scores (Foy, Galia and Li, 2008) .
To compute descriptive statistics of math test scores and regression coefficients and their standard errors, we apply Rubin's (1987) methodology for multiple imputations. 13 See e.g. Brunello and Checchi (2006) that show the number of books at home and the highest completed education of parents give similar effects on study achievements. similar in both countries and exhibit similar, relatively small changes between the two years. Table 4 reviews the descriptive statistics of TIMSS individual background characteristics in the two testing years for both countries.
Excess Demand
We explore whether the presence of high-stakes admission exams gives rise to extrinsic motivations fostering study efforts of students and increasing their study achievements measured here by TIMSS math test scores. If selective admission to Academic Schools creates additional study incentives, greater incentives and impact might be observed in districts experiencing higher relative excess demand (measured as a ratio of applications to admitted students minus 1) and negligible incentives in districts with zero excess demand. Therefore, we collected district level data from school registers and merge them to TIMSS data. In 2011, after the reform, the TIMSS testing preceded admission exams by about one year. Before the reform, the TIMSS tested students who had already finished preparation for admission exams while after the reform, the TIMSS tested students before they start preparing for admission exams. Our key hypothesis is that this forward To examine the impact of admission exams on achievements via higher study effort, we estimate the following model:
, The presence of high-stakes admission exams is not the only factor at the level of school system that can affect students' study efforts and their achievements. The degree of excess demand can foster incentives and increase performance in order to secure admission. This establishes variation in competitiveness across districts and in time. Given that the excess demand is correlated with the interaction term, the estimate of interaction coefficient in the previous specification of Eq. (1) may be biased due to the omitted variable. To get unbiased estimates, we consider augmented specification of Eq.
(1) controlling for relative excess demand:
, (2) where ED is relative excess demand 16 for Academic Schools in district d and time t.
Note that the degree of selectiveness should matter only in Slovakia before the reform, and hence, the coefficient γ 4 should be close to zero. The coefficient on the interaction term between treatment and the excess demand (β 2 ) captures the change in achievement due to more intensive study efforts initiated by the more competitive environment. Our key identifying assumption is that in the absence of treatment, the coefficient β 1 would be equal to zero. Specifically, it means that on average and conditional on our covariates, the TIMSS test scores in the Czech Republic and Slovakia would have followed the same trends if the Slovak reform did not occur. As we point out in Section 3, after the division of Czechoslovakia the school system of the two countries remained very similar. We document this by trends in test scores from the international survey PISA 17 that tests 15-year-old students (Figure 3) . Unfortunately, there are no other surveys available that would allow us to document similar trends more properly. Here, one has to rely on the assumption that the PISA test scores are not affected by the different grade of the first selection in the two countries before the reform. 18 . 17 We should show that TIMSS test scores in the two countries evolve with parallel trends after the 2009 reform in Slovakia. However, the TIMSS test scores after 2011 are not available yet. 18 The majority of students affected by the 2009 school reform in Slovakia have reached 15 years of age in the year 2014. Using the PISA survey before and after the reform, i.e. PISA 2012 and PISA 2015, respectively, we can additionally examine the effect of later selection, i.e. estimate whether one more year with the top students enhance or worsen achievements of students who remain in normal schools.
It should be noted that only 20% and 10% of students in the Czech and Slovak Republic, respectively, apply for Academic Schools. Therefore, one can argue that highstakes admission exams have a greater impact on the study effort and achievements of applicants while the impact on other students via, for example, peer-effects, is much lower. Unfortunately, TIMSS data do not contain information on whether individual students apply for Academic Schools or not. We use two alternative approaches taking into account that probability of applying is higher at the upper tail of the initial skills distributions.
First, we estimate model (2) Second, we estimate the percentile distance of each student from the admission threshold and enter it as an additional covariate to models (1) and (2). We assess the distance in the following way. We estimate the probability of a student admission to Academic School using data from an ad hoc follow-up survey of the Czech TIMSS 2011 cohort at the end of the 5 th grade (one year after TIMSS testing) containing information on whether a student was admitted to an Academic School 20 . We use estimated parameters of a probit model admitted / not admitted to predict corresponding admission probabilities for Slovak students. By ranking students by predicted probabilities within each district and taking into account the district-specific number of 19 For detailed description of quantile regression see Koenker (2005) . 20 Czech longitudinal project CLoSE ran a follow-up survey of the TIMSS 2011 students' cohort one year later and asked detailed questions concerning the preparation for Academic School admissions and results of admissions. CLoSE data allow us to estimate a Probit model of the probability of being admitted to Academic School for the Czech sample of TIMSS 2011 students.
slots at Academic School, we compute the absolute percentile distance of each student from the admission threshold in both directions 21 . We further use the distance variable to estimate the specification from model (2) on the subset of students who are close to the admission margin from both sides, i.e. whose distance variable is less than 5
percentage points.
Finally, we also estimate model (2) replacing overall math scores on the lefthand side by tests scores capturing individual cognitive domains of knowing, analysing, and reasoning. Table 5 presents estimated coefficients and their standard errors for different specifications of the difference-in-differences models (1) and (2) In the last Column (5) in Further, the treatment effect notably increases across the math test score distribution with the intensity of the selection process, but again only in the case of girls. Thus, girls in the lowest decile additionally increase their achievements by 0.1 standard deviations in districts with unit excess demand. On the other side, for girls in the highest decile, this effect is more than double. Among girls at the top decile, a unit change 23 in relative excess demand raises the achievement by 0.24 standard deviations compared to the 0.16 standard deviations in conditional means. Hence, in the districts with zero excess demand, the presence of admission exams affects more the study efforts of boys than girls (by 0.06 standard deviations) whereas in the highly competitive districts, i.e. with excess demand equal to 1, the treatment effect on achievements is higher for girls by around 0.2 standard deviations. Table 8 presents estimates of models (1) and (2) using the estimated absolute distances of students from district-specific admission thresholds. The estimated 23 Note that a unit change in relative excess demand corresponds to a substantial growth from a balanced demand-supply to demand being twice of supplied slots.
Results
treatment effect is equal to 0.19 and 0.15 standard deviations at the admission threshold for girls and boys, respectively, and is significantly declining with the increasing distance from the threshold.
The augmented specification is presented in the 2 nd column. Controlling for the excess demand, the average treatment effect becomes insignificant for both girls and boys. It means that there is zero treatment effect at the admission threshold in districts with no selectivity, i.e. with zero excess demand. Also, the effect of distance from the admission margin does not differ for students with or without the treatment. However, we observe very high positive estimates for excess demand in interaction with treatment for both genders. Here, a unit change in relative excess demand significantly raises the treatment effect by 0.52 and 0.33 standard deviations for girls and boys respectively.
This effect is further declining with the distance from the admission threshold. A percentile change in distance decreases the treatment effect of girls by 0.005 standard deviations. Hence, relatively low, and for boys even zero, effects of more selective admissions on average students' achievements are higher by around 0.3 standard deviations for students at the admission margins, i.e. for students who are most affected by admissions.
Focusing on the subset of students 5 percentage points above and below the admission margin and estimating the model (2), we obtain similar results as in previous specifications. Results are presented in Column (3) of Table 8 . These students exhibit zero average treatment effects that further increase with excess demand and achieve 0.6 and 0.4 standard deviations in districts with unit excess demand for girls and boys, respectively. We also pay attention to possible setbacks due to the ordinal nature of TIMSS test scores. There is a possible problem that one point change of the test score in the lower tail of skills distribution does not necessarily corresponds to the same increase in skills in the upper tail. This problem was highlighted by a recent study of Bond and Lang (2013) showing sensitiveness of estimated test score gaps on the choice of a scale.
They demonstrate that various monotone transformations of test scores can lead to very different test scores gaps.
To investigate the possible presence of this problem in our estimation, we apply several order-preserving scale transformations of TIMSS test scores similar to those used by Bond and Lang (2013) . By minimizing and maximizing the difference in the test score changes between Slovakia and the Czech Republic over time (i.e. DID effect), we can set an interval for a treatment effect that is robust to the choice of scale. In Table   10 we compare base-line model estimates presented in Column (4) in Table 5 with those of the difference-maximizing and difference-minimizing model. The estimated parameters are not effectively different from those of the baseline model, and the choice of scale does not significantly affect our estimates.
Summary and Conclusion
We address important policy questions concerning the impact of students' motivations on achievements. Educational psychology studies consider the role of external factors such as rewards, deadlines, competition or evaluation. A plethora of studies in this area shows that such incentives can increase students' study performance but can also undermine it. Our analysis focuses on particular, but very common and rarely investigated study incentives born by high-stakes admission exams and their consecutive impacts on students' achievements. High-stakes admission exams at early ages differ from other high-stakes testing like exit exams in that they affect an out-ofschool learning effort while not affecting in-school teaching intensity. If some students and their parents perceive admission exams to selective schools as contributing positively to their future study and labor market outcomes, such exams create additional study incentives based on personal interest.
Our empirical findings indicate that the presence of high-stakes admission exams to Academic Schools at the end of primary education motivate some students to intensify study efforts leading to higher achievements. Our identification strategy utilising exogenous quasi experimental policy intervention estimates treatment in the range of 20% of the standard deviation. The size of the treatment effect is very similar to the findings in existing empirical studies although they report students' efforts and teachers' incentives together. The effect is of the same nature for both genders, but girls seem to be more sensitive to the degree of competition and peer pressures. Although girls on average lag behind boys in mathematics, they are not deterred from admission exams and put higher efforts into securing their admission, especially, when they face pressure from a more intense selection process. We find that in districts with the most competitive admissions, i.e. with two applicants per one slot, girls increase their achievements by 0.3 standard deviations when they face admission exams in the near future. This effect is even higher on the top decile equal to roughly 0.42 and 0.25 standard deviations for girls and boys, respectively. Possible gender differences in motivation and its effect on academic performance can contribute to the gender inequality in educational outcomes, such as participation in academic education or test achievements. However, further research is needed to better understand the origin and consequences of gender differences in the creation of motivations to learn.
Our estimates identify notably a greater impact in the domains of reasoning and knowing. Hence, approximately equally, students improve both their basic and more complex math skills requiring a study strategy of deep processing (Elliot, McGregor and Gable, 1999) . This supports the results of a positive effect of high-stake admission exams as the deep processing is usually connected with intrinsic motivations enhancing study achievements.
Our findings should be used cautiously when arguing for early school selection. This is because early selection involves many other effects which, from a normative point of view, are much less desirable. These include the important role of family wealth, time devoted and personal pressure on the side of parents and perseverance, ambition, and rigour on the side of students. This means that selective schooling systems open space to factors whose role should be diminished by the primary schooling system. It relates to the current debate in the UK about Grammar Schools Note: Standard errors robust to clustering at the year and country level in parentheses. Standard errors are bootstrapped using 50 replications. *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
